seize the natural riches of Southeast Asia. The American price for lifting the oil embargo was Japanese withdrawal not only from French Indochina, but from China as well, forcing Japan to write off all her conquests and their costs in wealth and blood.
This US demand may seem incredibly harsh, or even stupid, but Record cites several distinguished historians who maintain that a conciliatory attitude on the part of America would almost certainly have been interpreted in Tokyo as a sign of grave weakness. The embargo was intended to deter a Japanese advance into Southeast Asia, but Japan was, in fact, not deterred, but was instead spurred to further actions, seeing the embargo as an act of war that required a response in kind. In fact, the Japanese decision to go south, toward the British, French, and Dutch possessions, was taken before the embargo. The oil embargo was the response to, not the cause of, the decision to seize Southeast Asia. Record also points out that the American demand that Japan evacuate China was actually against US strategic interest. The United States needed as many Japanese troops tied down in China as possible so as to protect the Soviet Union, then engaged in a death struggle with the Nazis. In Record's assessment, the United States went to war with Japan over China, not over Southeast Asia.
As Record makes clear, if Japan had invaded the European colonies in Southeast Asia and not attacked US territory, it would have been close to impossible for President Roosevelt to get Congress to declare war. But viewing the American Philippines as a danger on the eastern flank of their southward drive, aware that the United States was getting stronger, the Japanese enraged the Americans with their attack on Pearl Harbor. The Japanese believed that by seizing and fortifying islands in the central and south Pacific, they would convince America that some sort of peace was preferable to all-out war. Many (not all) Japanese leaders also believed that Hitler would defeat the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Parenthetically, a Japanese occupation of Hawaii would have forced the US Navy to operate from California, adding another 3,000 miles to the distance between the home islands and America's Navy. Among Record's major conclusions is one especially worth pondering-the story of Pearl Harbor abundantly illustrates the mistakes policymakers are prone to make when they are ignorant of the culture and history of a potential adversary.
Surprisingly, the final three pages of the book consist of a free-standing, hammer-and-tongs assault on the decision to go to war with Iraq. This reviewer is not able to understand why Record believed it was necessary to conclude his study of Japanese policy in this manner. But the infelicitous ending is a very minor blemish on a work that, like all of Record's books, is well-researched, vigorously written, intellectually challenging, and deserving of a wide readership among policymakers and indeed all students of international politics.
